Characterization of Error-Tolerant Applications when Protecting Control Data by Thaker, Darshan D. et al.
1Characterization of Error-Tolerant Applications when Protecting Control Data
 
Darshan D. Thaker †, Diana Franklin ‡, John Oliver †,
 
Susmit Biswas , Derek Lockhart ‡, Tzvetan Metodi †, Frederic T. Chong
 
†University of California, Davis
 
University of California, Santa Barbara
 




Abstract	 semiconductor device. This may lead to transient faults that 
cause single bit upsets, which in turn may introduce a logi-
Soft errors have become a signiﬁcant concern and recent cal fault in the circuit. In addition, as the number of transis­
studies have measured the “architectural vulnerability fac- tors increases, so does the complexity, which makes veriﬁ­
tor” of systems to such errors, or conversely, the potential cation a much harder process, thus increasing the chance of 
that a soft error is masked by latches or other system be- undetected errors. 
havior. We take soft-error tolerance one step further and A considerable amount of recent research has focused 
examine when an application can tolerate errors that are on understanding how errors in low-level circuits manifest 
not masked. For example, a video decoder or approxima- themselves in the architecture. Much of this research in 
tion algorithm can tolerate errors if the user is willing to error-tolerance has focused on preventing any errors from 
accept degraded output. The key observation is that while affecting the running program. One can run two copies of 
the decoder can tolerate error in its data, it can not tolerate the program, utilizing simultaneous redundant multithread­
error in its control. ing to detect and correct errors. At the hardware level, re-
We ﬁrst present static analysis that protects most con- liable circuits can be constructed from error-prone compo­
trol operations. We examine several SPEC CPU2000 and nents, but at the cost of increased circuit size and latency 
MiBench benchmarks for error tolerance, develop ﬁdelity [3]. Unfortunately, this cost is not sustainable when applied 
measures for each, and quantify the effect of errors on ﬁ- uniformly [4] . 
delity. We show that protecting control is crucial to produc- This paper focuses on applications that exhibit some tol­
ing error-tolerance, for without this protection, many ap­ erance to reduced accuracy. In the embedded domain, such 
plications experience catastrophic errors (inﬁnite execution tolerance is often used to accomodate variations in quality 
time or crashing). of service in communication and network performance. We 
Overall, our results indicate that with simple control suggest that trends in technology and usage shall motivate 
protection, the error tolerance of many applications can ”pushing” this tolerance into the microarchitecture. To do 
provide designers with considerable added ﬂexibility when so, we must understand what effect errors due to the mi-
considering future challenges posed by soft errors. croarchitecture have on the application. 
To manage this interaction between the microarchitec­
ture and applications, we leverage the following key ob­
1 Introduction	 servation: computations involving control are much more 
sensitive to inaccuracy than others [5]. We propose using 
As the minimum feature size of process technologies static analysis to identify instructions leading to control de-
continues to decrease, microprocessor designers are faced cisions. We present a set of applications that, when pro-
with new reliability challenges. Feature sizes of less than tected with our compiler, perform better in the face of er­
0.25µm result in an increased likelihood of noise-related rors. We quantify the beneﬁt of this protection by deﬁning 
faults that are the result of electrical disturbances in the application speciﬁc ﬁdelity measures for relaxed accuracy 
logic values held in circuits and on wires [1, 2] . Natural ra- requirements. Note that, although our focus is error-tolerant 
diation such as neutrons produced by cosmic rays and alpha applications, our solutions are not application-speciﬁc. 
particles generate electron-hole pairs as they pass through a We continue by describing the applications in Section 2. 
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2Application Description Fidelity Measure 
Susan edge detection Imagemagick comparison 
MPEG video encoding % frames not dropped 
MCF vehicle scheduler % extra time in schedule 
Blowﬁsh encryption % bytes correct from original 
GSM speech encoding/decoding signal-to-noise difference 
ART image recognition error in conﬁdence of match 
Table 1: Summary applications and their ﬁdelity measures 
We then present our static anlysis in Section 3. Sections 
4 and 5 describe our methodology and present our results. 
We place this in the context of recent work in Section 6. We 
conclude in Section 7. 
2 Applications 
We focus on application classes that do not require full 
accuracy to get their intended results. This can occur in 
several ways. First, applications that interact with human 
senses are very tolerant to slight inaccuracies. For exam­
ple, phone lines do not carry sound perfectly, yet are suf­
ﬁcient for human perception. Second, there are numerical 
and search algorithms that expect to iterate until an adequate 
answer is attained. 
In this study, we identify several applications that are tol­
erant of errors to varying degrees. All applications are part 
of SPEC CPU2000 [6] or MiBench [7]. Perceptual applica­
tions are more tolerant than decision-making applications. 
In order to evaluate each application, we deﬁne a ﬁdelity 
measure for this application. This is typically some sort of 
distance from the optimal solution. For some applications, 
we have also deﬁned a ﬁdelity threshold, which is a subjec­
tive measure on how much inaccuracy a user would tolerate. 
We will brieﬂy describe the applications we studied and the 
ﬁdelities we deﬁned for each one. The information is sum­
marized in Table 1. 
Susan 
Susan is an application, from the MiBench suite, that 
implements the Smallest Univalue Segment Assimilat­
ing Nucleus (Susan) Principle, which performs edge 
and corner detection and structure preserving noise re­
duction. The Susan Principle is implemented using 
digital approximation of circular masks, (sometimes 
known as windows or kernels). If the brightness of 
each pixel within a mask is compared with the bright­
ness of that mask’s nucleus, then an area of the mask 
can be deﬁned which has the same (or similar) bright­
ness as the nucleus. 
We use Imagemagick [8] to determine the ﬁdelity of 
the output. The ﬁdelity threshold is 10dB PSNR, which 
means that the output after error insertion is considered 
bad if Imagemagick, after comparing the corrupted and 
correct images, returns a difference of 10dB or greater. 
MPEG: 
The MPEG standard, ﬁrst proposed by the Moving Pic­
ture Experts Group in 1993, currently forms the most 
popular compression method for video and audio, and 
for streaming applications. Instead of encoding each 
frame individually, frames are encoded as the differ­
ence bewteen themselves and the previous frame, al­
lowing for much denser encoding. 
There are three types of frames in an MPEG ﬁle, in or­
der of importance they are: I frames, P frames and B 
frames. In general, the loss of B and P frames can be 
compensated for by the decoder, while the loss of an 
I frame will result in very noticeable quality degrada­
tion. 
Our ﬁdelity measure is the number of bad frames. A 
frame is considered bad if the SNR value compared 
to the correct frame is more than 2dB for I frames, 4 
dB for P frames and 6 dB for B frames. The ﬁdelity 
threshold, or the acceptable quality for viewers, is 10% 
of bad frames. 
MCF is a benchmark from the SPEC 2000 integer bench­
mark suite. It is a single-depot vehicle scheduler for 
public mass transportation. Based on routes and de­
sired frequencies of service, a schedule is determined. 
The schedule is determined using a network simplex 
algorithm which is a specialized version of the well 
known simplex algorithm for network ﬂow problems. 
We measure the ﬁdelity of the MCF schedule with er­
rors inserted by comparing the schedules of an optimal 
schedule. 
Blowﬁsh is a symmetric block cipher with a variable 
length key. It was developed in 1993 by Bruce Schnei­
der. Its key length can range from 32 to 448 bits. The 
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3input data used is ASCII text ﬁle. The ﬁdelity mea­
sure is the percent of bytes that match between the in­
put(original) and the output data. The output data was 
obtained by decrypting the data obtained by encrypting 
input. The ﬁdelity measure is the percent of similarity 
of the input ASCII data and the output ASCII data. 
Adpcm or Adaptive Differential Pulse Code Modulation 
(ADPCM) is a variation of the well-known standard 
Pulse Code Modulation (PCM). The ADPCM en­
code/decode package included in this benchmark was 
implemented by Jack Jansen. The ADPCM encoder 
takes 16-bit linear PCM samples and converts them to 
4-bit samples, yielding a compression rate of 4:1. The 
decoder program converts the adpcm data to pcm data. 
The input data are small and large speech samples. 
ADPCM encode/decode have approximately 80% in­
teger ALU operations and fewer than 10% branch op­
erations for a very computation intensive operation. 
The ﬁdelity measure is the percent of similarity of the 
output PCM data when errors were inserted with the 
output PCM data with no errors inserted. Though the 
input data is sample speech ﬁle, this metric was used 
instead of SNR as this benchmark does not treat data 
and hearder separately. Hence the generated output 
was not speech ﬁles. Instead they were ADPCM en­
coded data of sound ﬁle. 
GSM is a benchmark from the MiBench suite in the 
telecommunications group. GSM communications is 
the communications standard that operates the major­
ity of cell phones in Europe. A large speech sample is 
ﬁrst encoded, then decoded. The ﬁdelity measurement 
used is the signal-to-noise difference between the de­
coded output with errors inserted into the decoder, and 
the decoded output without error insertion. Typically, 
a 6 dB loss in signal for voice communications does 
not distort voice communications beyond recognition. 
ART is a benchmark from the SPEC 2000 ﬂoating point 
benchmark suite. ART is a neural network utilized to 
identify items within an image. After the neural net 
is ﬁrst trained on objects, it is provided with a ther­
mal image. The thermal image is scanned with a win­
dow corresponding to the size of the learned objects. 
From this windowed imageage, the neural net attempts 
to identify the objects it has learned. 
All of these applications have in common the fact that 
they can tolerate errors in just certain areas of the algo­
rithms. For example, if the approximation algorithm were 
to exit the loop too early, that would constitute failure, not 
just increased execution time. Likewise, if the simulated an­
nealing problem ended early, it might exit with a local max­
ima, not a global maxima. Worse, if the decision itself were 
corrupted, it might give the wrong answer altogether. It is 
important in our work that we analyze where the algorithms 
are tolerant to errors. Somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁnd that 
we can perform our protection at the assembly level with an 
automatic compiler. The programmer identiﬁes which func­
tions can tolerate some error to their data, and the compiler 
tags instructions that do not affect the control operations. 
3 Static Analysis 
We found in a previous study[5] that protecting data used 
for control increases the ﬁdelity of MPEG dramatically. In 
this section, we describe a simple data ﬂow analysis tech­
nique for identifying Def-Use chains that lead to control 
ﬂow decisions. 
Our goal for perfoming data ﬂow analysis is to identify 
arthimetic instructions that lead to a change in control ﬂow. 
The technique we employ is used in contemporary com­
pilers to determine reaching deﬁnitions [9], which enable 
optimizations such as loop-invariant code motion and copy 
propagation. We start at the last instruction of a basic block 
and move in the direction opposite program ﬂow, tagging 
arithmetic instructions that do not inﬂuence control ﬂow. 
We assume inter-procedural analysis. 
We deﬁne elements of set CVar as variables likely to in­
ﬂuence control ﬂow. Any arithmetic instruction whose des­
tination variable is not ∈ CVar is tagged. In addition, each 
instruction may add and/or remove elements from CVar. 
Instructions that directly inﬂuence control ﬂow will add el­
ements to CVar. Instructions that deﬁne (write to) variables 
∈ CVar will both remove those deﬁned variables and add to 
CVar the variables used in the deﬁnition. The process com­
pletes when set CVar becomes empty. Note that CVar may 
not be empty even after we consider all instructions in the 
current basic block. As a result, to complete this analysis, it 
may be necessary to cross basic block boundaries and even 
procedure boundaries. 








I0: $2 = $4 + 1 *
 
I1: LD $3, addr []
 
I2: $2 = $3 + 2 [$3]
 
I3: $3 = $3 + 8 [$3, $2]
 










4Algorithm Errors Introduced Total Instructions % Failures With Protection 
% Failures 
Without Protection 
Susan 2200 144M 0% 10% 




















ART 4 42.77B 0% 0% 





Table 2: The percentage of catastrophic failures (inﬁnite runs or crashes) with and without protecting control data. 
I5: $10 = $3 << $2 [$3, $2] tional simulation.

I6: $4 = $3 + $6 [$3, $10] *
 
I7: $3 = $3 + 1 [$3, $10]
 60
I8: BNE $3, $10, label [$3, $10]
 Static Analysis ON 
Static Analysis OFF 
Fidelity threshold 
2300 1550 1100 920 100
 
The above code shows two basic blocks, BB0 and BB1. 
We wish to determine what instructions, from those shown, 
will affect the outcome of the branch that ends BB1. The 
square brackets after each instruction show the contents of 
set CVar after processing each instruction. (BNE: branch if 
not equal, LD: load from address) To start the analysis, we 
begin at the bottom of basic block 1, at instruction I8, and 
set CVar is empty. I8 generates elements $3 and $10 for 
CVar. I7 deﬁnes $3, thus it will remove $3. But I7 also uses 
$3 thus adding it back to CVar. I6 does not change CVar and 
may safely be tagged. I5 will remove $10 while adding $2. 




























thus removing it, ﬁnally set CVar becomes empty as a result 
of instruction I1. The instructions we tag as not inﬂuencing Avg. Errors Inserted 
the branch in instruction I8 are I6, I4 and I0. 
4 Methodology 
There were two major elements to our experiments. The 
ﬁrst is the static analysis, and the second is the simulation. 
Static analysis was performed at the MIPS assembly 
level. Only functions that were user-identiﬁed as eligible 
were tagged. In order to be eligible, the data in the func­
tion must be in some way tolerable to error. A memory 
allocation function, for example, would not be eligible for 
tagging. A function that manipulates the data in an image 
would be. 
Our compiler generated tagged executables that were 
then run on on Simplescalar[10] enivironment for func-
Figure 1: Susan Results 
Error Insertion:In this paper, we do not attempt to study the 
masking effects of circuits or of the microarchitecture on 
soft-errors. We are interested in the behavior of the appli­
cation when an error, a bit-ﬂip, becomes visible to it. To 
model this, we ﬂip a bit in the result of an instruction that 
was tagged as not inﬂuencing a control decision. We as­
sume that untagged instructions will be protected in some 
way (e.g. redundant exection or extra hardware). 
Single bit-ﬂip errors were randomly inserted with a uni­
form distribution. Once an error was introduced in any in­
struction, it would propagate to all dependent instructions. 




 10 much higher than current soft error rates. This was nec­essary to evaluate the change in ﬁdelity as the error rate 
increased.
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Figure 2: MPEG Results 
5 Experimental results 
Our purpose is to show that several benchmark applica­
tions are error-tolerant. We begin by showing that with­
out protecting control data, even applications that were de­
signed to tolerate errors experience frequent catastrophic 
failure. We continue by showing the degradation in ﬁdelity 
as errors are introduced into the applications. Finally, we 
look at the potential in performance and/or cost by exploit­
ing this error tolerance. 
5.1	 Protecting Control Data 
Ideally, we would show the difference in ﬁdelity between 
running the unchanged application in the presence of er­
rors and running the application that has been tagged by our 
compiler. We found that without protecting control data, a 
very high percentage of the simulations failed, making such 
a comparison was unfeasible. Table 2 shows the percentage 
of simulations that ended in catastrophic failures for each 
application. Two data points are shown, one on each end 
of the number of errors introduced to that application. We 
show the lowest error rate for which the unchanged appli­
cation failed for all simulations. 
We ﬁnd that without protecting control data, there is little 
or no error tolerance. This true even for applications like the 
MPEG decoder, which can work around inconsistencies in 
data such as loss of packets. We also see that even with our
Errors Inserted 
Figure 3: MCF Results 
static analysis, some failures do occur. Because we perform 
no memory disambiguation, it is possible for an a value, 
tagged as not inﬂuencing control, to be written to memory 
and later to be read back from memory and used for a con­
trol calculation. If an error where introduced into such a 
value, it could lead to a catastrophic failure. So although 
we make great strides in protecting control data, we do not 
protect everything. 
5.2	 Error Tolerance with Control Protec­
tion 
We begin with MPEG and Susan, whose results are 
shown in Figures 2 and 1. These applications were simu­
lated with very high error rates because no ﬁdelity was lost 
at lower error rates. We see that it takes more than 100 
errors per second before Susan shows any frame loss due 
to the SNR being too low. In addition, although the unpro­
tected execution suffers no catastrophic errors, the ﬁdelity is 
substantially lower than with protection. MPEG has about 
2% loss at 10 errors per second. It has no results without 
protection, since all simulations crashed. For Susan, dis­
abling protection leads to very poor ﬁdelity of output, how­
ever it does not crash the application. This can be attributed 
to the relatively small number of instructions (fewer than 
9% ) that are intolerant to error as shown in table 3. 
In Figure 3 we see the results of the SPEC 2k benchmark 
MCF. The MCF benchmark performs quite well with errors 
inserted. Over 95% of schedules are still correct with 20 
errors inserted into a simulation run of over 201M instruc­
tions. The incorrect schedules were all noticeably incorrect 





6the schedules were not just inoptimal, but incomplete. So 
someone using the application would know immediately to 
rerun the application. 
Figure 4 shows the effect errors had on the encryption 
application Blowﬁsh. At 10 errors, the output is identical 
to the correct output. As we add more errors, however, the 
application begins experiencing catastrophic failures as well 
as a loss in precision. At 40 errors inserted, it fails 17% of 
the time, and its accuracy is only 84%. 
The GSM application, shown in Figure 5, performs quite 
Algorithm Instructions % Low Reliability Instr 
Susan 144.3M 91.3% 
MPEG 2.74B 50.3% 
MCF 201.0M 8.9% 
Blowﬁsh 507.1M 62.4% 
ADPCM 324.1M 93.26% 
GSM 892.0M 19.6% 
ART 42.77B 70.8% 
Table 3: The number of instructions and percentage of dynamic well when subjected to errors. Only a 95% of SNR, or 2dB 
instructions that our static analysis identiﬁed as not leading to loss of signal, is heard if 20 errors are inserted over a run of 
control instructions. These instructions could be run in a low­892M instructions. Seven dB are lost with the insertion of 
reliability environment. 40 errors.
less than 10% of its instructions, making it the most promis­110  50Fidelity 
Failures 
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40
































































Figure 4: Blowﬁsh Results 
The ART application from SPEC 2k suite is more sus­
ceptable to errors. With only two errors inserted, only three 
quarters of the time did the benchmark correctly identify 
the object it was looking for in the thermal image. It never 
suffers from catastrophic error, however. 
5.3 Future Potential 
Fault-tolerance in itself is not our goal. We would like 
to exploit this property to provide faster or cheaper relia­
bility. We could employ well-known reliability implemen­
tations to protect control data while running the rest of the 
instructions, labeled in Table 3 as low-reliability instruc­
tions, on cheaper or faster hardware. In order for this to be 
beneﬁcial, a sufﬁcient percentage of the execution must be 
on low-reliability instructions. The table above shows that 
Susan, our most error-tolerant application, needs to protect 
50  0
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40
Errors Inserted 
Figure 5: GSM Results 
6 Related Work 
Our work is related to many areas of error-tolerance. 
There has been recent work in reducing the cost of relia­
bility, more accurately modeling soft errors, and providing 
applications that can tolerate errors. 
Many groups have developed techniques to provide cor­
rectness in the face of failures. The RAMP architecture [11] 
dynamically adapts the reliability of the processor depend­
ing on the device properties through time. As different com­
ponents fail, the architecture adjusts parameters to maintain 
the overall level of reliability desired. Weaver et al [12] de­











































applications in [19]. Our work is similar in spirit, but we fo­
cus on compiler support to protect control data, which we 
ﬁrst proposed in [5] and ﬁnd in this study to be critical when 
examining broader application domains. 
7 Conclusions 
Our results indicate that error-tolerance in some applica­
tions offer signiﬁcant potential for architectural optimiza­
tion. However, it is imperative to protect control structures 
when executing in an unreliable environment. Even the 
most fault-tolerant applications, mpeg and susan, are very 
sensitive to errors that affect their control. We ﬁnd that with 
static analysis, many applications can be protected such that 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4
their tolerance to errors is greatly improved. Moreover, the 
Errors Inserted fraction of dynamic instructions related to control structures 
is often small when compared to overall execution. This in-
Figure 6: Art Results dicates that only moderate effort is necessary for an archi­
tecture to protect these instructions through redundancy. 
reducing the impact of errors. They analyzed which struc­
tures were less reliabile and reduced the time spent in those 
structures. Mukherjee et al [13] studied how to more ac­
curately model errors in microarchitectures. Austin et al 
propose the Razor architecture [14], which uses “shadow 
latches” to check pipeline paths in the presence of voltage 
overscaling. 
There is a growing movement to curtail the costs of reli­
ability. Reis et al [15] propose allowing the user to switch 
between levels of reliability at the software level. That way, 
unimportant applications like web-surﬁng will not pay the 
costs, whereas banking applications would. We focus on al­
lowing lower reliability within an application, as opposed to 
across applications. Kumar et al [16] reduce the resources 
necessary to redundantly execute instructions. 
All of the above work is complementary to ours. Since 
we have shown that applications are more tolerant to er­
rors than previously believed, we could selectively apply 
the techniques described above. 
The theoretical foundations of this work are based in ap­
proximate signal processing [17] and ﬂexible computation 
[18] which deals with systematic tradeoff between accuracy 
of results and the utilization of resources in their implemen­
tation. Video compression is a good application of approx­
imate signal processing because the human perception sys­
tem can inherently tolerate some inaccuracy. This can be 
exploited to create a hierarchy of importance in terms of 
the underlying data, in terms of the impact on distortion 
caused by a particular piece of data, which in turn can be 
used to make dynamic resource trade-offs, which in the case 
of video is typically the bit rate. Li and Yeung examine such 
error tolerance for two multimedia and two decision support 
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